Ernst Freund: pioneer of administrative law by Firmage, Edwin B.
ERNST FREUND—PIONEER OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
• I. B iographical S ketch
Erast Freund was born in New York City on January 30, 1864, during a 
visit of his family to the United States from their native Germany. Much of 
his education took place in Germany, a fact that significantly influenced his 
views on administrative law. He studied successively at Dresden, Frankfort, 
Berlin, and Heidelberg, receiving the J.U.D. degree from the University of 
Heidelberg in 1884. From 1886 to 1894 he was engaged in the practice of law 
in New York City. In 1892 he started his long career in teaching, beginning 
at Columbia College as professor of administrative law. He obtained a Ph.D. 
in political science from that institution in 1897.1 In 1894 he joined the newly 
created University of Chicago as professor of political science, teaching 
Roman Law and Jurisprudence. In 1902 he became a member of the original 
faculty of the law school. He was appointed the first John P. Wilson Professor 
of Law in 1929, a position which he held until his death on October 20,1932.2
II. W hat Is A dministrative La w ?
In retrospect, it is relatively easy to see that the growth of the administra­
tive process was, in the words of Mi. Justice Jackson, “the most significant 
legal trend of the last century. . .  .”3 But at the turn of the century, American 
legal scholarship was largely unaware of what was beginning to emerge. Two 
exceptions to this understandable unawareness existed in the persons of 
Frank Goodnow and Ernst Freund. Significantly enough, both men pos­
sessed not only backgrounds in the law, but also in political science. Goodnow 
seems to have been the first to use the term “administrative law” as an inclu­
sive and descriptive term for the law governing the administrative process.4 
Writing in 1894, Freund observed that until recently administrative law had 
attracted no attention from either English or American jurists. He noted that 
the field was not even distinguished by a commonly accepted name. He ex­
pressed the hope that the term “administrative law,” as used by Goodnow the
1 His last degree, an honorary LL.D., was bestowed upon him by the University of 
Michigan in 1931, one year before his death.
2 H a n d b o o k  o f  t h e  A ss’n  o f  Am. L a w  S c h o o ls  a n d  P r o c e e d in g s  o f  t h e  T h i r t y - F i r s t  
A n n u a l  M e e t in g ,  163-64 (1933); 21 D ic t .  o f  Am. B io g . (supp. 9) 323 (1944); Kent, Ernst 
Freund—Jurist and Social Scientist, 41 J. P o l .  E c o n . 145 (1933); Kent, The Work o f  Ernst 
Freund in the Field o f  Legislation, 1 U. C h i. L . R e v . 94 (1933); N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1932, 
p. 21, col. 4; Chicago Tribune, Oct. 21, 1932, p. 9, cols. 3 and 4.
3 “The rise of administrative bodies probably has been the most significant legal trend of 
the last century and perhaps more values today are affected by their decisions than by those 
of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart.” F.T.C. v, Ruberoid Co., 343 
U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
* G o o d n o w , C o m p a ra tiv e  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  (1893).
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year before, would become the accepted term. He foresaw that administrative 
law would eventually become an accepted branch of public law:
The body of law which is thus developed regulates and limits governmental • 
action without involving constitutional questions. Its subject matter being 
the administration of public affairs, as distinguished from legislation on 
the one side and from the jurisdiction of the courts on the other.. .  ,s
The dichotomy made between constitutional law and administrative law as 
early as 1894 is better appreciated when it is understood that this differentia­
tion was not fully seen by many of the great legal scholars until well into the 
1930’s.6 Freund was later to add to this early definition a statement that 
should constantly be borne in mind by students of administrative law: “Ad­
ministrative Law continues to be treated as law controlling the administra­
tion, and not as law produced by the administration.”7
It is clear that Goodnow and Freund, who was Goodnow’s student at 
Columbia, were the pioneers of administrative law; however, Goodnow’s 
greatest contribution was to the field of political science, whereas Freund’s 
writings more definitely set the direction for the study of administrative law 
as it would be taught in the law school.
Goodnow’s early casebook, Cases on Government and Administration,8 
today would be classified as a work primarily in the field of public adminis­
tration and political science. His Law o f Officers and Extraordinary Remedies» 
did not point the way toward what would come to be considered the field of 
administrative law. The first part of the book dealt with the law of officers, a 
topic not now discussed under any field of the law in the law schools. The latter 
part of the book contained long and detailed analysis of extraordinary reme­
dies, a subject which now is generally deemphasized. Goodnow’s Principles 
o f  Administrative Law o f  the United States10 came closest to the direction 
Freund’s wprk would take. But again there was combined with what would 
now'be called the law governing the administrative process much of what 
would now be termed public administration. It included such chapter headings 
as “Term and Tenure of the Heads of Departments,” “Organization of 
Executive Department,” “History of Rural Local Administration,” “Munici­
pal Organization in the United States,” and “Qualification for Office.” An­
other point of difference, and one that could perhaps fairly be termed a weak­
ness, was his emphasis on the constitutional aspects of administrative law. 
While the emphasis was not as pronounced as that given it by later scholars,11
s Freund, The Law o f  the Administration in America, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 403 (1894).
6 See the discussion of Felix Frankfurter and Freund, pp. 760-63 infra.
7 F r e u n d , C ases o n  A d m in istra tiv e  L a w  a t  v (1928).
s G o o d n o w , C ases o n  G ov ern m en t  a n d  A d m in ist r a t io n  (1906).
9. G o o d n o w , C a ses  o n  t h e  L a w  o f  O ff ic e r s — I n c l u d i n g  E x t r a o r d i n a r y  L e g a l  
R em ed ies  (1906).
10 G o o d n o w , P r in c ip l e s  o f  t h e  A d m in istr a tiv e  L a w  o f  t h e  U n ited  States (1905).
-11 S ee pp. 760-63 infra. ,
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the contrast becomes evident when Freund’s total exclusion of constitutional 
law from administrative law is examined.12 In 1912 Thomas Reed Powell con­
cluded that, while Goodnow pioneered the study of administrative law for 
students of government, Freund opened the field for students of law.*3
The correctness of this conclusion becomes clear when Freund’s early writ­
ings are examined. It is significant that his earliest writings on administrative 
law were done in the journal of a discipline other than law.14 Administrative 
law was not “law” in the minds of the great majority of lawyers and legal 
scholars, nor would it be so considered by many for years to come.
Two works contain the major contributions of Freund to the definition, 
scope, and content of administrative law. These books are Cases on Adminis~ 
trative Law,15 the first edition of which appeared in 1911, and Administrative 
Powers Over Persons and Property which appeared toward the end of his 
life. The first of these volumes was to exert an influence upon the study of ad­
ministrative law that is difficult to overemphasize. It was the first casebook 
published in the field of administrative law and remained the only one until 
1932.17 Whether the unique position of the casebook was due to a general 
consensus that it was so superlatively done th^t no other work was necessary, 
or whether at that time there was so little demand for casebooks on admin­
istrative law that no one else cared to construct one, is hard to determine. 
Freund’s contemporaries seemed to think the former alternative more nearly 
approached the truth. While only one law review took note of this book, the 
reviewer, Thomas Reed Powell, had a prophetic view of the role it was to 
play. His first paragraph indicated much of the contemporary skepticism to­
wards the new discipline that was just beginning to claim the name of “law” : 
The study of administrative law is indebted to this compilation of Professor 
Freund’s for a service even more important than that rendered to the law 
of trusts by the case-book of Dean Ames. The subject matter of the collec­
tion still receives but slight recognition in the law school curriculum. 
Those who concede its existence as a separate field of study disagree as to 
its scope and content. There is still room for the work of a pioneer. Pro­
fessor Goodnow has blazed the trail and made straight the way for the stu­
dent of government. Professor Freund’s interest seems to lie more particu­
larly in developing the subject from the point of view of individual private 
right. His selection and arrangement of cases merits unqualified approval
12 See F r e u n d , C ases o n  A d m in istr a tiv e  L a w  (1911).
Pow ell, Book Review, 12 C o lu m . L. R e v . 570 (1912). See also Vandenbosch, Book 
Review, 17 K y . L.J. 81 (1928).
14 Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 P o l ,  Sci. Q. 625 (1893); Freund, The Law  
o f  the Administration in America, 9 P o l .  Sci. Q. 403 (1894). See P a r t  II infra.
13 F r e u n d , C ases o n  A d m in istra tiv e  L a w  (1911).
16 F r e u n d , A d m in istr a tiv e  P o w ers  O ver P ersons a n d  P ro perty  (1928).
”  The Frankfurter and Davison casebook, C a ses  o n  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w , was pub­
lished in 1932.
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not only because it provides an admirable case-book for the class-room and 
thus promotes the study of an important subject, but because it aids 
materially in securing a more definite conception of what are still ill-defined 
categories of legal principles.18
Walter Dodd of Yale, writing for what was then the combined law review 
for the University of Chicago, Northwestern University, and the University 
of Illinois, underscored the book’s significance as seen from the perspective 
gained by seventeen years between editions:
The author of this volume is primarily responsible for the attention now 
given to the important problems of administrative law in law schools of 
this country. His volume of “Cases on Administrative Law,” recently is­
sued in a second edition, has determined the scope of law school courses- 
in this field; and his activities as Chairman of the special committee on 
administrative law and practice of the Commonwealth Fund have largely 
determined the character of special investigations in this field. By the 
present volume he has still further increased the debt which all students of 
our legal system owe to him.19 
Others have joined in attributing the beginning of study of administrative law 
in the law schools primarily to this casebook.2®
The first paragraph of Freund’s book vividly shows what the author was 
struggling with; it shows a keen mind trying to strike to the heart of the ad­
ministrative process. It shows his perception of a common element in a host 
of problems at that time largely ignored in the curriculums of the law schools 
or fragmentized into many classes: :
The subject of administrative law covers a number of topics, which jn 
treatises and digests are generally divided between the law of public offi­
cers and the law of extraordinary legal remedies, but which will also be 
found treated incidentally under such various heads as municipal corpora­
tions, taxation, highways, elections, intoxicating liquors, nuisances, public 
health, public lands, etc. ■
The common element, which gives the subject its unity, is the exercise 
of administrative power affecting private rights, and the term “administra­
tive law” . . .  [is] the best designation for the system of legal principles 
which settle the conflicting claims of executive or administrative authority 
on the one side, and of individual or private rights on the other.21
is Powell, Book Review, 12 C o lu m . L. R e v . 570 (1912).
19 Dodd, 23 III. L. R e v . 623 (1929). The Commonwealth Fund, referred to by Dodd, 
set aside funds for legal research in 1920. The Chairman of the Legal Research Committee 
was James Parker Hall, Dean of the University of Chicago Law School, and included such 
men as Max Farrand, Benjamin Cardozo, Roscoe Pound, Harlan F. Stone, and Charles 
Evans Hughes. The special committee on Administrative Law and Practice consists of 
Freund as Chairman, with Walter L. Fisher, a prominent Chicago attorney, Felix Frank­
furter of Harvard, and Frank Goodnow, then President of Johns Hopkins. „
20 See, e.g., Kent, Ernst Freund—Jurist and Social Scientist, 41 J. P o l .  E c o n . 145, 150
• (1933).
21 F jre o n d , C a se s  o n  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  1 (1911).
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The table of contents of this early casebook indicates how meticulously 
Freund avoided intermixing the fields of constitutional law and administra­
tive law. He did not discuss the separation of powers or delegation of powers, 
as Frankfurter was later to do to so extensively. To Freund, administrative 
law did not serve as another vehicle for the study of constitutionalism. He 
launched directly into a study of the administrative process. No one would 
expect that the subject matter discussed in 1911 would be the same as that 
discussed in a casebook written in 1962, particularly after the growth of the 
administrative process in the 1930’s. However, the emphasis upon the $tudy 
of the administrative process rather than upon constitutional problems in­
volving administration is today the most modern, the most realistic, and the 
most useful approach.22 This approach to the study of administrative law— 
which may as accurately be termed a definition of what constitutes adminis­
trative law—was abandoned in the early 1930’s with the advent of the second 
major casebook on administrative law.
The emphasis of the study of the administrative process was continued in 
the second edition of Freund’s casebook in 1928. Fewer pages were devoted 
to extraordinary remedies; one chapter was devoted exclusively to the injunc­
tion, for it was becoming apparent that that remedy would be the most impor­
tant of the extraordinary remedies. Recognition of the contributions of this 
casebook to administrative law was widespread. A reviewer commented that 
one of Freund’s early assertions, namely, that the law to be studied is that 
which controls the administration rather than that law which is produced by 
the administration, had now gained full acceptance.23 Almost all the reviewers 
commented on the advisability of rigorously separating constitutional law 
from this field.24
The second major volume written by Freund was Administrative Powers 
Over Persons and Property, published in 1928. This volume reveals the influ­
ence of Freund's continental education and at the same time brings into sharp 
focus the difference between his approach and that of Goodnow. This work 
was the first empirical study of the administrative process as a device to con­
:: "The three large segments of administrative law relate to transfer of power from 
legislatures to agencies, exercise of power by the agencies, and review of administrative 
action by the courts. As recently as a quarter of a century ago, tbe subject was still largely 
limited to the first and third of these, with concentration upon the doctrines of separation 
of powers and non-delegation. But as of the middle of the century, the theory of separation 
of powers, while still guiding the drafters of constitutions, has hardly any influence upon 
administrative arrangements or activities. The problems of delegation are tending to dis­
appear from federal law and are of sharply diminishing importance in state law.
"The heavy emphasis is now upon the administrative process itself—rule maVrng and 
adjudication, and such incidental powers as investigating, supervising, prosecuting, advising 
and declaring." D a v is , A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w : C a se s -T e x t-P ro b le m s  2  (1960j.
Reed, Book R ev iew , 28 M ic h .  L. Rev. 223 (1929).
Zi Laube, Book Review, 14 C o r n e l l  L.Q. 261 (1929k Nichols. Book Review. 24 III. 
L. R e v . 740 (1930;: Yandenbosch. Book R e v ie w . l~ Kv. LJ. 81 (1925,).
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trol the public, while much of Goodnow’s writing was an internal examination 
of public administration coupled with studies of the law of public officers and 
extraordinary remedies.
While Freund specifically disclaimed any belief that this work constituted 
a systematic treatise on administrative law,25 several reviewers maintained 
that it came closer to that than any other volume then in print.26 The author 
compared the statutory law on the administrative process in England, Ger­
many, New York, and the United States. Freund felt that legislation was be­
coming an even more important factor in the development of administrative 
law than the courts. His approach was foreign to the inclinations of a scholar 
with only a common law background.
Freund attempted to define and categorize the various aspects of the ad­
ministrative process. He began by dividing the field of administration into 
“service” powers and “control” powers. He observed that fundamental con­
stitutional limitations upon government operate more weakly where govem- 
ment is performing a “service” (e.g., aid to state roads, mail distribution) 
than where it furnished “control” (e.g., child labor laws). After confining his 
study to “control” powers only, he further delimited it by excluding powers 
of a “functional status” (appointment and removal of officials) and “non­
determinative” powers (powers which do not determine private rights). This 
left “determinative” powers as the object of his study. These he divided into 
“enabling” and “directing” pov/ers, the licensing power being an example of 
the former, the rate-fixing order typifying the latter. Freund concluded that 
the “directing” power resembled the judicial power and was consequently 
more controversial when employed by administrative agencies. While the 
terminology has not survived, much of his classification of phenomena of the 
administrative process has remained, largely because of the penetrating analy­
sis of what was actually being done. By emphasizing the study of the admin­
istrative process, Freund provided an acute insight into the needs of the 
emerging discipline and expressed a view more in harmony with the needs of 
administrative law today than some who were to follow.
The first casebook published after Freund’s was edited by Felix Frankfur­
ter and J. Forrester Davison in 1932.27 The theme of this casebook becomes 
- evident from' its interesting introduction. Long quotations from Aristotle, 
Locke, Montesquieu, Farrand, Jefferson, Maitland, Elihu Root, Calvin 
' Coolidge, and others on the broad problems of constitutionalism and the 
separation of powers are included. After a dedication to “Ernst Freund—
25 F r e u n d ,  A d m in i s t r a t iv e  P o w e rs  O v e r  P e r s o n s  a n d  P r o p e r t y  a t  vii (1928).
26 Cheadle, Book Review, 15 C o r n e l l  L. Q. 507 (1930); Dodd, Book Review, 23 I I I .  
L. R e v . 623 (1929); Patterson, Book Review, 29 C o lu m . L. R e v . 101 (1929). Kent said that 
this work was the “most important effort that has been made to provide a classification and 
terminology adequate to reduce this new and amorphous subject to some kind of rational 
order.” Kent, Ernst Freund-r-Jurist and Social Scientist, 41 J. P o l .  E c o n . 145, 151 (1933).
27 F rankfurter  a n d  D aviso n , C ases o n  A dm in istra tiv e  L a w  (1932).
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Pioneer in Scholarship,” the book proceeds to redefine the boundaries that 
he had set for administrative law. The book is divided into three parts, part 
one entitled “Separation of Powers,” part two “Delegation of Powers,” and 
part three “Judicial Control of Administrative Action.” Parts one and two 
embrace problems of constitutional law not dealt with by Freund. The first 
part deals primarily with the constitutional status of the judiciary, while the 
second part deals with the role of the executive in the legislative process. Only 
in part three do the authors treat problems that could be considered uniquely 
administrative in nature, and even in this part the focus of the authors was 
upon constitutional aspects of administrative law.
This preoccupation with constitutional problems was applauded by Paid 
L. Sayre, who had the unique opportunity to study under both Frankfurter 
and Freund,2* Sayre felt that the constitutional emphasis of Frankfurter and 
Davison would be the trend of the future. He observed that their casebook 
was “dominantly one of the constitutional law aspects of administrative 
l aw. . and that Freund’s was “very different” in that “he was not con­
cerned about the heights of constitutional law.”2? He referred to Frankfurter’s 
flight to the “peaks” of constitutional law ai|d suggested that Freund was 
content to dwell in the “valleys” of the administrative process. In this com­
parison of the two approaches to the definition of administrative law, Frank­
furter definitely emerges as the leader to whom future scholars should refer.
In reviewing the new casebook for the Harvard Law Review, Freund, in the 
year of his death, proved to have the more accurate view of the trend of the 
future.30 He observed that two-thirds of the casebook dealt with constitutional 
problems and commented that “it cannot be said that the selection or ar­
rangement of the cases fulfills the expectations aroused” by the prefatory re­
marks.31 He asserted that if administrative law were to establish itself as a 
separate area of the law, deserving of a name and a literature, it had to carve 
but an area more uniquely its own. Freund recognized the relevancy of ques­
tions concerning the proper scope of legislative delegation, but felt that these 
would not be the pressing problems of the future. The curriculums of law 
schools, he said, already exposed the students to an abundance of such writ­
ings and offered very little opportunity to “become acquainted with the tech­
nique of administrative powers in their nonconstitutional aspects.. .  .”32 He 
then made a striking statement which at once suggested a reason for Sayre’s 
misjudgment and correctly pointed the way for the future:
To teachers and students alike a well-considered and well-written discus­
sion of a  constitutional problem generally appears as the last word o f  
juristic performance, and the reviewer acknowledges the spell exercised by 
some o f the very decisions in the present collection, the permanent value
2S Sayre, A Common Law o f  Administrative Powers, 18 Iowa L. Rev. 241 (1933).
29 Id. at 242. 31 Id. at 168.
30 Freund, Book Review, 46 H a r v .  L . R e v . 167 (1932). 32 /</. at 169.
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of which he is strongly inclined to regard with skepticism. His attitude of 
doubt with reference to the editor’s heavy commitments in the way of 
constitutional cases is due to the feeling that they involve serious losses in 
other directions, and that it is largely owing to lack of space that the non­
constitutional side of administrative law receives such relatively meager 
treatment.33 '
In support of Professor Frankfurter’s approach it may be noted that many 
problems in administrative law today are still concerned to some degree with 
constitutional questions such as the right to a hearing. But the constitutional 
issues that so enthralled Frankfurter centered around the separation and 
delegation of powers, issues having only peripheral relevance to administra­
tive law. It may be asked whether Professor Frankfurter might not have been 
right in including a discussion of such problem, at that time in American his­
tory, the time of the Great Depression, even though such topics might not be 
appropriate in either 1911 or 1962. It must be remembered, however, that this 
book was published in 1932, before the New Deal legislation clashed with the 
Supreme Court on these very issues. Regardless of the timeliness of a discus­
sion of the basic issues of constitutional government, the context in which the 
topic was presented, namely administrative law, would seem to be improper.
The next substantial advance in defining administrative law was produced 
by the contributions of E. Blythe Stason, Professor of Law and later Dean 
of the law school at the University of Michigan. An examination of his case­
book shows that the definition of administrative law was shifting toward 
Freund.34 Even though published squarely in the middle of the controversy 
between the New Deal and the Supreme Court, little emphasis was put upon 
constitutional aspects of administrative law. The table of contents makes this 
clear. With the writing of Walter Gellhom, Professor of Law at Columbia 
University, the trend away from constitutional interpretation of administra­
tive problems became even stronger. In the 1940 edition of his casebook,35 
Gellhorn reversed Professor Frankfurter’s apportionment by devoting only 
200 pages to the separation and delegation of powers, and over 800 pages to 
an analysis of the administrative process. In the 1947 edition of Gellhom’s 
casebook, the heading “separation of powers” was dropped and less than one- 
tenth of the book was devoted to constitutional problems. By 1960, with the 
publication of Kenneth Culp Davis’ casebook,36 this trend would seem to 
have been completed. There, less than twenty pages are included—mainly to 
explain why the problem of delegation of power is not really a problem of 
administrative law.
It would be an overstatement to say that the casebooks of Professors
33 Id. a t  170.
31* Stason , C ases o n  t h e  L a w  o f  A d m in istr a tiv e  T r ib u n a ls  (1936).
35 G e l l h o r n ,  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w — C a ses  a n d  C om m ents (1940).
3® D avis,  A d m in istr a tiv e  L a w : C ases-Text-P roblems (I960).
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Stason, Gellhom, and Davis are the fruition of the work of Freund. The 
many changes in the administrative process demanded original and creative 
analysis by these later scholars. But at least the direction of the study of ad­
ministrative law and the basic definition of what it consists, as established by 
Freund, were continued by these men.
To note the importance of constitutional issues, as did Sayre and Frank­
furter, should not lead to the conclusion that these are central to the study of 
administrative law. From two standpoints this would seem to be the wrong 
approach: First, the topic is already covered by existing courses in constitu­
tional law. Merely to teach the same subject-matter from a different viewpoint 
is hardly profitable in the extremely compressed yet fragmentary curriculum 
of the law school. Second, one must descend from the. “peaks” that Sayre 
mentions and delve more deeply into the administrative process to gain a 
complete understanding of the problems.
What would seem to be needed would be more of the work proposed by 
Freund: empirical studies of specific aspects of the administrative process. 
Jefferson and Montesquieu may provide historical perspective as to where we 
have been and where we want to go. But such^an approach is valueless with­
out a knowledge of precisely where we are now. This can only be accom­
plished by the Freund approach to the study of administrative law—a minute 
and often tedious examination of the administrative process.
III. A dministrative La w  as a  L iberal A rt
As noted, it is not without significance that the early writing of Freund in 
the field of administrative law was done in the journals of disciplines other 
than the law.3? The struggle to have this subject accepted as a separate and 
legitimate branch of the law was integrally connected with the general attempt 
to liberalize the curriculums of leading law scholars. At the turn of the century 
the Harvard Law School, under the leadership of Dean Ames, continued to 
exclude from its curriculum any topic not considered to be “pure law.”38 
Subjects infected with aspects of the liberal arts were banned from the curricu­
lum, and borderline subjects were relegated to graduate classes or seminars. 
William R. Harper, the first President of the University of Chicago, had tenta-
3? See articles cited note 14 supra.
38 Looking back over Harvard’s experience, Professor Samuel Williston wrote:
"Doubtless we were somewhat narrow and shortsighted in the nineties and in the early 
years of this century.
“It will seem strange today that the Faculty of the School was unwilling to have a pro­
fessor of International Law appointed although a fund left by George Bemis to support the 
professorship had been accumulating for years. Edward Strobel was elected by the Corpora­
tion to the professorship in 1898 without the approval of the faculty. And though the Cor­
poration had its way in his election, the Faculty really won the victory, if victory it can be 
called, for Strobel’s courses on International Law were never allowed credit for a degree. 
International Law was not law, said Professor James B. Thayer; ‘it has no binding force 
and we are training young men for a practical profession.’ ” H a r v .  L. B u l l .  5 (1948).
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lively arranged with the Harvard Law School to establish some sort of pater­
nalistic arrangement between Harvard and the proposed law school at Chi­
cago- It was believed that the mid-West needed a school of comparable quality 
to Harvard. Arrangements were made for one of Harvard’s most brilliant 
professors, Professor Beale, to come temporarily to Chicago in 1902 to be the 
. first Dean of the law school. During the course of negotiations, Professor 
Freund was sent to Harvard to discuss his proposed curriculum with Dean 
Ames and Professor Beale. After this meeting, Dean Ames wrote the follow­
ing letter, dated March 31, 1902, to President Harper:
D e a r  D r . H a r p e r :
Professor Beale and I found Professor Freund a very likable man, but I 
must confess that our interviews with him have given me serious misgiv­
ings as to the wisdom of the plan of having Mr. Beale go to Chicago, even 
temporarily as Dean of your new Law School.
I have in all my talks with you spoken without reserve, and I feel 
bound to write with equal frankness now.
I understood it to be your wish and purpose to establish at your Uni­
versity a law-school resembling as closely as possible in its curriculum, 
methods of study, and quality of its Faculty, the Harvard Law School. Do 
not understand me as believing now that this is not still your wish and 
purpose. But knowing your high estimate of Professor Freund, and having 
. discovered how widely his conception of your new School differs in funda­
mentals from our School, I feel that before further steps are taken we 
ought to clear away all possibility for any subsequent misunderstanding 
and disappointment. To this end I cannot do better than mention the main 
differences between Professor Freund’s conception of a law-school and 
our ideas of a law-school.
First, as to the curriculum—Professor Freund suggested that 2/9 of the 
work leading to the degree should consist of subjects belonging properly 
in the departments of Political Science or. Sociology. We have no such sub­
jects in our Curriculum and are unanimously opposed to the teaching of 
anything but pure law in our department. Nor would the transfer of such 
subjects to a post-graduate year in the School accord with our conception 
of the true function of a law-school.
Secondly,—Professor Freund would admit to the Law Faculty, the pro­
fessors who teach these subjects of Political Science and Sociology and 
also the professors who are to give the instruction in the prae-legal year 
. preparatory to the law course. We think that no one but a lawyer, teaching 
law, should be a member of a Law Faculty. I will not undertake to say in 
what department of your University the prae-legal year should be placed, 
but it would be altogether foreign to our ideas to have it in the Law 
School. We believe the success of our School is due in no small degree to 
the solidarity of our Faculty and to its concentration upon the work of 
teaching the law pure and simple. '
Thirdly,—The method of study. Our School is conspicuous for its belief 
in the learning of law by the systematic study of Cases. If Professor Beale
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is to be Dean with the purpose of reproducing the Harvard method, he 
must have a Faculty that believes in that method. Whether Professor 
Freund is convinced that that is the true way of studying law I do not 
know. I did not ask him his views on that point. Certainly his belief in the 
general methods.of the German Universities, and his general views as to the 
function of a law-school would predispose him against a thoroughgoing 
belief in us or our methods. Professor Mechem as a Iaw-teacher, is also, to 
me, an unknown quantity. I cannot think it wise, therefore, that Professor 
Beale should subject our School to the loss of his teaching, until he is 
assured that he is to have a body of colleagues who will support him 
loyally because of their belief in him and his methods.
I have talked of course, with President Eliot since Professor Freund’s 
visit. He and the other members of the Corporation agree that it is not 
for the interest of this School that Professor Beale should have the pro­
posed leave of absence unless you desire him for the purpose of establish­
ing with his new colleagues, a School like ours, that is a School with a cur­
riculum of pure law, with a Faculty made up exclusively of professors, 
who are lawyers, approved by him and believing in Harvard standards and 
Harvard methods. \
Bearing in mind your statements that Chicago lawyers regard our meth­
ods with distrust, and that the lawyers on your Board of Trustees, in par­
ticular, do not believe in us, and knowing your high estimate of the prob­
able influence and effectiveness of Professor Freund in the proposed Law 
Faculty, I can readily understand that, whatever may be your personal 
inclinations, you may, upon reflection, deem it inexpedient to invite Pro­
fessor Beale to come to you upon these terms.
Should you decide not to invite Mr. Beale after reading his letter and 
one from him to be written as soon as he receives the formal answer from 
the Corporation as to leave of absence, I need hardly say, that we shall 
be quite content. Nor shall we lose our interest in your School. On the con­
trary we shall watch its development under favorable auspices, upon lines 
different from ours, with the hope that it may not only achieve a distinct suc­
cess, but that it may throw new light upon the problem of legal education.39
signed , J a m e s  B a r r  A m es,
39 Letter from James B. Ames, Dean of the Harvard Law School, to William R. Harper, 
March 31, 1902, on file in the Archives of the University of Chicago.
This statement of the aims and content of a legal education should be compared with that 
given by T. J. Lawrence in his “Memorial on the Creation of a Law School in the University 
of Chicago,” on file in the Archives of the University of Chicago: “The proposed Law De­
partment must aim at something more than the preparation of its students for practice. It 
must make legal studies into an instrument of liberal education. Unless they can be so used 
they have no place in the University curriculum. But there need be little real difficulty in 
adapting them to the wants of those who seek culture as well as professional knowledge. 
Such persons will desire to become acquainted with the history of their subject, with the 
scientific analysis of legal conceptions and with the ideals at which law should aim, as well 
as with the technical rules which govern the cases that will come before them in their daily
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This letter was followed on April 2, 1902, by a letter to President Harper 
from Professor Beale, reiterating the main points of the letter of Dean Ames:40 
the distrust of the heretical views on legal education of Freund; the necessity 
of a faculty composed completely of “persons who teach law in the strict
work. They will, therefore, be willing to spend more time in the study of law than is abso­
lutely necessary in order to gain a bare qualification for practice. It should be the object 
of the University of Chicago to give such students as these a training that will enable them 
to become leaders of the bar and ornaments of the bench, inspiring teachers, scientific 
writers and wise reformers, rather than to produce the greatest possible output of eager 
youths, quick to pick up professional technicalities and careless of aught beyond profes­
sional emolument.'’
*° Dean Beale’s letter to Dr. Harper:
“ M y  D e a r  D r . H a r p e r :
The Corporation granted me leave of absence to become Dean of the new law school 
‘provided that the School to be established at Chicago is to have ideals and methods similar 
to those of the Harvard Law School.’ They intended to make my going conditional upon 
such a school being established. An explanation of this vote is necessary.
“You will remember that we consented to the inconvenience of my leaving at this time 
solely that 1 might help you establish a school on the model of the Harvard Law School. 
Except for this purpose (which we believe to be for the benefit of legal education) we should 
not have considered your proposition. The Corporation have taken the same view.
• “We were perhaps not quite justified in supposing that at our second interview you had 
in mind a school in all respects like ours. But you still desire, I suppose, one so nearly like 
it in spirit, in scholarship, and in curriculum that as you suggested, the students of the two 
schools might (if such an arrangement could be made) pass from one to another without loss 
of time; and you wish to cany on in Chicago the same sort of work, and hope for the same 
measure of success as ours. .
“We should have assumed that everybody in Chicago was of the same mind-, if it had not 
been for the ideas Mr. Freund expressed here. I dislike to speak of this matter, because 
Mr. Freund personally made such an agreeable impression upon me; but it is best to be 
frank at the outset. He seemed to be cognizant of your plans for a school, and what he had 
in mind was absolutely opposed to our ideas and methods. I could be of no use in such a 
school.
“Let me state, as I understand it, the fundamental plan of the Harvard Law School.
“We take a student for three years, and demand all his time. We permit him to do no 
serious work outside the strictly legal subjects we teach. We require of him no more work 
than the average student can do faithfully; and we intend the faculty to do no more work 
than is consistent with unimpaired elasticity of mind, interest, and energy. We thus keep the 
student’s interest keen, and we make sure that everything he studies shall be thoroughly 
mastered. The faculty, determines in the first instance all matters of general policy within 
the school, and is composed solely of persons who teach law in the strict sense of the word. 
We think that experience justifies us in believing that in this wa> alone we can turn out 
thoroughly trained men, fit at once to enter upon the practice of a learned and strenuous 
profession.
“Such a school as Mr. Freund has in mind differs from ours in almost every one of 
these particulars.
“He wishes to put into the three-year course certain subjects which are not law in any 
sense, and to that extent to diminish the time and thought devoted to the study of law. This 
is a very serious matter, and one which I regard as of radical importance. He wishes to re­
quire of the student more work than seems to me wise; and of the teacher more than he 
can do, year after year, without becoming dry and uninteresting. The legal courses which he 
has.in mind are different in length from the courses given in the best schools. The length 
of a ‘course’ is to be sure largely an arbitrary thing; but the fact that the Schools have ar­
rived at a tacit agreement in the matter suggests that the law is most naturally taught in 
that way. In all the schools which are similar to ours there is a typical ‘course’ of about 60
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sense of the word”; the faculty entirely composed of lawyers; and strict ad­
herence to the case method. Beale complained of Freund’s views on the num­
ber of credit hours the latter was demanding from the law student. Harvard 
had a maximum load of ten quarters hours, while Freund proposed consider­
ably more. Beale then made an interesting observation about the Columbia 
Law School:
A notable exception is the Columbia Law School, where the students have 
fourteen hours a week, and some of the teachers over nine hours. The cur-
hours (though in some schools there are in particular cases variations from this length). In 
most of the same schools the teacher’s work is six hours a week, and that of the student 
ten hours. A notable exception is the Columbia Law School, where the students have four* 
teen hours a week, and some of the teachers over nine hours. The curriculum of that school 
also includes a few non-Iegal electives from the School of Political Science. These facts have 
been suggested as accountable for the striking failure of the school to take the position to 
which her location, her wealth, and the ability of her faculty seem to entitle her.
“These differences of view are so fundamental that it is obviously necessary to choose one 
conception of the school or the other. I cannot spare the time to go from here and teach a 
short time in a school which I do not believe to be wisely organized; nor if I am to introduce 
Harvard methods in parts of two years, with the bench and the trustees lukewarm, can I 
accomplish anything unless the faculty is in hearty sympathy with the plan.
“I believe thoroughly, as 1 told you, in academic freedom, and would by no means wish 
to dictate methods of teaching to any man deemed worthy of an appointment to the faculty; 
but every teacher must be in hearty sympathy with the ideals and aims of the school, and 
no one should, I think, be called to teach who does not express such sympathy. Where so 
many good law schools exist, a school can stand at the head only by doing as well as pos­
sible everything it has to do. It is not enough to get good teachers and good students; the 
teachers must at all times be able to give their best efforts to teaching, and all must pull to­
gether. If the plan of the school is to be such as I approve, all the other teachers should 
approve it; if not, I must not be there to create discord.
“The matter comes to this, then. In accordance with the vote of the Corporation, I must 
ask for distinct and definite assurances on the following points before accepting the honor­
able appointment you offer me.
1. That no subjects shall be taught in the School or counted toward the degree but 
strictly legal subjects. The degree shall be given only after a three-years study of such 
subjects.
2. That the policy of the school shall be formulated in the first instance by a faculty 
consisting only of lawyers. Of course I do not mean that the faculty shall be independent 
of trustees or other governing bodies, but that it shall not be filled with men who are not 
lawyers, and have had no experience as teachers in a law school.
3. That no person shall teach in the school who does not frankly concur in adopting for 
the school the spirit and the methods of the Harvard Law School.
4. That you yourself will heartily support me in the effort to establish in your new school 
'ideals and methods similar to those of the Harvard Law School.’
“Pray do not regard me as seeming in any way to dictate your policy. If on reflection and 
inquiry you do not believe it wise to commit Chicago to such a policy, I shall with entire 
satisfaction remain here and do what I can to help you,—I couldn’t help you by joining 
your faculty. But you will, I feel sure, agree that it is better for us to have an absolutely full 
and frank understanding at the outset.
“As soon as I get your answer, if you wish still to have me at the head of the only kind 
of school I could teach in, I shall be able to go on to Chicago, meet the other members of 
the faculty, and discuss details of the organization.
Very sincerely yours,
J o s e p h  H . B e a l e , J r . [signed]”
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riculum of that school also includes a few non-legal electives from the 
school of Political Science. These facts have been suggested as accountable 
for the striking failure of the school to take the position to which her 
location, her wealth, and the ability of her faculty seem to entitle her.
He then listed the above-mentioned conditions as prerequisites to coming to 
Chicago as Dean..
The two main fears of Ames and Beale were revealed in a letter, dated 
April 7, 1902, from Beale to Freund.41 Beale reported that:
Ames was more disturbed than I by what he (and I) consider your heretical 
views about law. The hard fight which he and Mr. Langdell had in this 
faculty several years ago made him anxious that I should not meet a similar 
difficulty.
Beale said that he feared two things most: First, an assault upon the case 
method of legal instruction; and second, the deleterious effects upon “pure 
law” if the heresies of “political science men” were allowed in the law school: 
“The faculty might be made up largely of political science men . . . .  The very 
eminence of Professor Judson and the others would give their ideas over­
powering weight.”
It is obvious from the writings and casebook of Freund that he did believe 
in the case method of study. What he suggested was nothing that today seems 
so heretical: the effectiveness of the case method of legal instruction begins to 
decline about the middle of the student’s second year.42 Such views, 
though radical at the time, are today held by some of the leading 
American scholars.43 The proposed curriculum,44 injecting “political science”
41 Letter from Joseph H. Beale, Jr. to Ernst Freund, April 7,1902, on file in the Archives 
of the University of Chicago.
42 Van Hecke, Ernst Freund as A Teacher o f  Legislation, 1 U. C h i . L. R e v . 92, 93 (1933).
43 Although few educators would deny the effectiveness of the case method of legal in­
struction, the extreme position taken by editors of some casebooks in excluding textual 
materials is now being attacked. For example, in Davis, Administrative Law: Cases-Texi- 
Problems. preface, at x, the author states that: “ingenious editors, searching for the most 
effective ways to maximize student understanding, discover time and again that the best 
form for particular material is textwriting. But they refrain. Or they curtail. They find a 
case. Or they find someone else's words to set out. When they yield to tneir own best judg­
ment and write some text, they often cramp it into the style of a note. And more.often than 
not, no matter what its merit for education, they print it in small type. The} fear the anti-text 
bias. So powerful a force is the anti-text bias that hardly anyone dares to attack it openly.
“The unsound factor behind the anti-text bias is the erroneous belief that textwriting is 
not for training the mind but is only for informing the mind. Let me say that again. Let me 
shout it in italics: The notion that textwriting is not fo r  training the mind but is only fur in­
forming the mind is a misunderstanding, and a thoroughly pernicious one."
For another example of a case book constructed to permit full use of both text and cases, 
see G r e g o r y  &  K a l v e n , C ases a n d  M a t e r ia l s  o n  T o r t s  (1959). A reviewer observed: 
“Teachers accustomed to the usual parade of cases followed by rather spare footnotes may 
be struck by the editors’ extensive resort to excerpts from the periodical literature. . . .
“Another prominent feature of the editors’ method of presentation is the constant prac-
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into the "pure law” of the usual legal curriculum,*  ^ sounds much like the 
liberal law school of today. The first year consisted of traditional law subjects, 
with only one class that deviated from the “pure law” system, a class in inter­
national law by Professor Judson of the Political Science Department. During 
the next two years, thfe usual courses offered at the better law schools were to 
be available, with a class in administrative law to be offered by Professor 
Freund. The classes objectionable to Beale and Dean Ames were criminology, 
finance, railroad transportation, accounting, the relation of the state to indus­
try, banking, municipal sociology, experimental psychology, and others of a 
like nature.
In the end, Beale came to Chicago to become one of the great Deans in the 
school’s history. Instead of the seemingly inevitable clash between the views 
of Beale and those of Freund, the technical brilliance of Beale merged with 
the liberalism and vision of Freund to produce a happy blend of rigorous 
technical proficiency and far-sighted curriculum. While close ties were estab­
lished with Harvard, Freund retained a good portion of his proposed curricu­
lum. His class in administrative law offered to second and third year students, 
though not the first to be regularly taught in a law school in this country, was 
second only to a class offered by Goodnow at Columbia at the early date of 
1892.46 Classes in international law by men from the Political Science Depart­
ment were offered, along with a class in “systematic and comparative jurispru­
dence.” Some classes such as “relation of state to industry” and “railroad 
transportation” were not allowed.
This pioneering work to liberalize the curriculum of law schools led to the 
introduction of administrative law into the leading law schools. As men­
tioned, Columbia had led the way with a class in administrative law in 1892.47 
Chicago was next introducing a class in administrative law for second- and 
third-year students in 1902, the first year of the law school’s existence.48 At
tice of following each decision with probing editorial inquiries___” Malone, Book Review,
28 U . C h i . L . R e v . 391, 391-92 (1961).
-14 Proposed Curriculum of Ernst Freund, on file in the Archives of the University of 
Chicago.
^ Professor Davis has noted that: “The area most in need of original research is the one 
that has been most neglected—the political science aspects of the regulatory process. . . . 
The need is for studies designed to provide an empirical basis for increasing administrative 
effectiveness in accomplishing the objectives of regulatory legislation. To what extent are 
legislative choices nullified by administrative failures'? To what extent do the regulated 
groups control the regulators? To what extent, if at all, do regulatory agencies effectively 
represent an otherwise unprotected public interest?" Davis, Reflections o f  a Law Professor 
on Inst rue t ion and Research in Public Administration, 47 A m . P o l . S c i . R e v . 728, 748-49 
(1953).
46 C o l u m b ia  C o l l e g e  H a n d b o o k  o f  I n f o r m a t io n  1892-93.
v  Ibid.
The course, offered in alternate years, was not actually taught until 1903. The Law 
School Announcement contains an interesting description of the course: “Administrative
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Yale, a class in “extraordinary legal remedies,” comprising a large part of 
some of the early courses in administrative law, was offered as early as 1903­
04.49 By 1917-18, administrative law still was not available to the Yale law 
student in the three-year curriculum leading to the LL.B., but in 1917 a class 
in “administrative law and public officers” was offered to graduate students 
working for the degree of Master of Laws, Doctor of Law, and Doctor of 
Civil Law. This course was taught by Professor Borchard and used as texts 
Freund’s Cases on Administrative Law and Goodnow’s Comparative Adminis­
trative Law. In 1918-19, a class in administrative law was available at Yale 
for the first time with credit applicable to the LL.B. degree. At Harvard, ad­
ministrative law was first available in 1911-12 as a graduate class taught by 
Professor Wyman. This continued until 1915, when Professor Frankfurter 
taught the class. In 1929, on the eve of the greatest expansion of the adminis­
trative process in our history, Harvard reduced this graduate course, taught 
only every other year, to a seminar. Although it was not a lecture class, one 
compensating factor existed in that the seminar was open to undergraduates. 
Not until 1939 was-a lecture course again available at Harvard, and then only 
as a graduate course. It was not until 1941-42 that Harvard offered a lecture 
course in administrative law with credit available to the student working to­
ward the LL.B. degree.30 ' ■
IV. Substantive V iews
A.- The Administrative Process—A Necessity.
The administrative process has been'one of the favorite scapegoats for this 
nation’s ills. Erroneously assuming that the administrative process has a 
political complexion of its own, politicians and jurists have attacked it as 
being socialistic,si communistic,52 and unnecessary.53 While such of the 
criticism seems to come from the uninformed,54 a distressing amount comes
Law. Judicial control of administrative acts; administrative regulations; administrative 
determinations; due process and conclusiveness; powers in aid of execution of laws; en­
forcement of statutes.” C ir c u l a r  o f  I n f o r m a t io n  10 (1902-03). ,
49 C a t a l o g u e  o f  Y a l e  U n iv e r s it y  (1903-04). "
50 H a r v a r d  U n iv e r s it y  C a t a l o g u e s  (1 9 1 1 -1 9 4 2 ). ‘
st B e c k ,  O u r  W o n d e r l a n d  o f  B u r e a u c r a c y  (1932). See note 54, infra.
52 Roscoe Pound, then chairman of an American Bar Association committee on admin­
istrative agencies, referred to “administrative absolutism” as a doctrine which was making
great headway “in American institutions of learning___” He said that this was “a Marxian
idea much in vogue just now among a type of American writers.” 63 A.B.A. R e p . 331, 339­
40 (1938).
53 H e w a r t , T h e  N e w  D e s p o t is m  (1929); 59 A.B.A. Rfcp. 539 (1934).
54 “Uncle Sam has not yet awakened from his dream of government by bureaucracy, 
but ever wanders further afield in crazy experiments in state socialism. Possibly some day 
he may awaken from his irrational dreams, and return again to the old conceptions of gov­
ernment as wisely defined in the Constitution of the United States.” B e c k , op. cit. supra 
note 51, at ix. .
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from those who should know better.55 While much of this was a reaction to 
the revolutionary development of the administrative process made necessary 
by the depression of 1929, extreme distrust of the process is still evidenced, for 
example, by the recommendations of the Task Force on Regulatory Commis­
sions of the Second Hoover Commission.56
In this regard, the views of Ernst Freund, expressed as early as 1894,57 may 
seem more appropriate for our age. He observed that the growth of the ad­
ministrative process was inextricably linked to the increasing complexity of 
modern society and the changing concept of the function of government. In 
speaking of the need for an expansion of the administrative machinery in the 
state governments, he said in 1894:
It is a different question, and one as to which speculation is more justifiable, 
how far the present administrative system of the American states will be 
able to retain its peculiar features unimpaired, in view of the constant and 
inevitable expansion of the sphere of modem state activity. This must ex­
tend the province of administration as well as of legislation. Our system 
is the product of an extreme democratic spirit, combined with a compara­
tive simplicity of the conditions of government in the early history of the 
states. The spirit of democracy seems at the present time to seek different 
methods of asserting itself from those chosen in the first half of the cen­
tury; and simplicity must necessarily give way to more complicated condi­
tions with the progress of material civilization. The purpose of the framers 
of our state constitutions appears to have been to keep the government as 
weak as possible, but the strength of the government must grow with the 
expansion of its functions.58 
He did not view the administrative process as having an independent political 
direction of its own and wasted no time lamenting the passing of simple gov­
ernment. Because he saw this development as largely inevitable, Freund 
found little merit in debating the wisdom of the trend. To him the only legiti­
mate area of debate concerned ways to secure private rights, by internal check 
and judicial review, in the face of the inevitable growth of the administrative 
process*9
B. Control o f the "Administrative Branch
In the past the accepted view was that the administrative organs of govern­
ment should be responsible to Congress. In the Landis Report, a modern view
• - See Pound, supra note 52.
s* Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force 
Report on Regulatory Commissions (1955).
57 Freund, The Law o f  the Administration in America, 9 P o l . S c i . Q . 403 (1894).
ss Id. at 424.
59 Kent, Ernst Freund—Jurist and Social Scientist, 41 J. P o l . E c o n . 145 (1933). A s  he 
neared the end of his life, Freund characterized his era as “an era of regulation which com­
bined respect for private right with a growing sense of the social obligations of property 
and business, and which fully recognized the paramount claims of public interest,” F r e u n d , 
A d m in is t r a t iv e  P o w e r s  O v e r  P e r so n s  a n d  P r o p e r t y , at viii (1928).
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was put forth arguing for a centralization of responsibility under the Execu­
tive.60 This appears to be a modern and characteristic example of the assimila­
tion by the Executive of functions that Congress has proved itself unable to 
cope with. However, Freund saw the emergence of this trend at a very early 
date. Although speaking of the chaotic conditions of some of the administra­
tive organs of state governments, his underlying rationale applied to any divi­
sion of government:
Now the legislature, while it has to some extent increased the executive 
power of appointment, has withheld from the chief executive all the func­
tions of control, direction and review, which in Europe and also in our 
federal government hold the administrative organization together.61 
And again:
The principle of specialization and diffusion of powers without executive 
direction or control imposes upon the legislature functions which are really 
administrative.. . .  The legislature thus becomes in a certain sense the cen­
tral administrative authority of the state—a position for which it is altogether 
unfitted. Executive action is in its nature responsible, because the officer 
who directs is also bound to see how the direction is carried out, and because 
. the executive authorities are subject to the control of the courts or to im­
peachment; legislative administration, however, is both legally irrespon­
sible because the legislature is not amenable to any direct control, and 
morally irresponsible because it is beyond the capacity of a large body to 
act intelligently on matters in which it has no interest.62
C. Sovereign Immunity.
The doctrine that the state cannot be made an unwilling party defendant has 
been difficult for laymen, as well as some legal s c h o l a r s , to appreciate. While 
modifications of the doctrine have removed some of its harshness today, in 
1893 Freund recorded that his was a voice in the wilderness in opposing a doc­
trine “strenuously supported by the current judicial opinion.”64 Typical of 
that position was the statement of Mr. Justice Holmes:
A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or 
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be 
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the 
right depends.65
Writing contemporaneously with Holmes, Freund traced the history of sov­
ereign immunity. Its origin in English monarchical government was evident*
See Landis, Report on Regulatory Agencies to the President-Elect at subsection F, 
p. 81 (I960).
61 Freund, supra note 57 at 409.
62 Id. at 413.
S3 E.g., D a v is , A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  T e x t  450 (1959).
64 Freund, Private Claims Against the State, 8 P o l . Sci. Q. 625, 640 (1893).
63 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
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Since the courts functioned under the direction of the sovereign, the King 
could hardly issue his writ commanding the sheriff ta command the King to 
appear. Voluntary submission was granted in England at an early date under 
Edward I.66 But the remedies developed in England did not become part of 
our common law upon Independence. While our judiciary succeeded to the 
powers of the English courts, the executive had only such powers as were 
vested in him. The residuary public power was vested in the legislature. This 
resulted in a totally ad hoc system of redress of grievance by petition to the 
legislature. Freund noted that, as of 1893, a few states had amended their con­
stitutions to permit claims to be brought against the state governments in the 
courts. While he considered this movement a step forward, he attacked the 
notion that it was still a matter of grace and not of right.67 He especially 
inveighed against the notion that the courts had a jurisdiction more limited 
than the liability of the state and maintained that the only question should be 
the substantive question of the extent of the state’s liability. He questioned the 
distinction drawn between the abilit) of the courts to grant negative but not 
affirmative relief. He listed the various subterfuges that the courts used to cir­
cumvent the doctrine and concluded that a doctrine inducing such subter­
fuges should be “condemned and abandoned."’ He observed the inconsistency 
with which the courts chose to look behind a suit against an officer of the gov­
ernment to find the real party in interest and inferred that if the whole doc­
trine could not be eliminated, then the courts should at least consistently re- 
liise to see the real party in interest. Then, in a clear and impelling passage, 
showing Holmes’ logic to be the very conceptualism which Holmes denied, 
Freund struck at the foundation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity:
There are evidently cases where justice demands the adjudication of right 
against the state, while the logic o f the law apparently forbids it—Appar­
ently, for the conflict is not real. It is believed that subjection to the juris­
diction o f the courts is inconsistent with the nature o f sovereign power. It 
is true that the courts themselves derive their power from the state. But 
the *tate is an exceedingly complex organism, and its functions are widely 
divergent. It is guided by proprietary interests, like an individual, in the 
management o f its corporate funds and domain; by public, as opposed to 
private, interests in the general political administration; while its aim in 
the dispensation o f justice is the purel> ideal one o f the preservation of 
law and rights, the concentration of these various functions in one power 
would be impossible without a separation o f organs. Therefore, the ad­
ministration o f justice in every civilized state is vested in organs which are, 
to all intents and purposes, independent o f the government in the narrower 
sense o f the term. Consequently, when the state appears before the courts 
on a question o f property rights, a party in interest appears before an im­
partial arbiter, and the proceeding is not open to the objection that the
66 Statutum de Tallagio (1297), 34 Edvv. 1,4 c. I.
67 Freund, supra note 64 at 630-31.
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state is a judge in its own cause. Thus, on a true conception of the nature 
of the judicial power, the subjection of the state to the jurisdiction of the 
courts involves no inconsistency of functions.. . .  It would . . .  be absurd 
to deny that the state can refuse to submit to-the jurisdiction of its courts.
But why, in the absence of a distinct expression of will, either by the con­
stitution or by the legislature, should a tacit refusal be implied rather than 
a tacit consent? Would it not be reasonable to assume such a consent where 
the state descends from the plan of its sovereignty and enters into purely 
private relations, that is to say, in all civil causes of action ?6S
Writing fifty-three years before the Federal Tort Claims Act, he observed 
that the law was well settled that the government was not liable for tort. From 
this he deduced that “the clearer the legal wrong and the more unjustifiable 
the act complained of, so much more undisputed is the exemption of the gov­
ernment from legal liability.”69 He foresaw what was to become the govern­
mental-proprietary distinction in determining the liability of government and 
correctly prophesied that the distinction could not be completely maintained. 
He concluded that the courts were even finding no liability for acts of the gov­
ernment or their officers which were blatantly private in nature. He said that 
the courts were creating this doctrine themselves, at times apparently against 
the express desire of the legislature.
By 1932, in preparing a report for the International Congress of Compara­
tive Law at the Hague, just two months before his death, Freund could take 
small comfort in what progress he had seen in the weakening of this doctrine. 
He noticed that torts were still excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims and proposed that a congressional act provide for tort jurisdiction. 
He said that if the doctrine of sovereign immunity could not be dislodged, the 
government should consistently assume the burden of all judgments rendered 
against its officers, and the courts should consistently refuse to look behind 
the officer to see the real party in interest. He found state practice no better 
than that of the federal government:
[T]he refinement of distinction according to which a city is liable if a per­
* son is run over by a street cleaning cart (because its function is proprie­
tary) but not liable if a person is run over by a fire truck (because the func­
tion is governmental) is notorious.70
D. Extraordinary Remedies.
The methods by which state courts allow judicial review of administrative 
actions are now recognized as one of the major deficiencies of administrative
68 Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added).
« Id. at 644-45. '
70 Freund, Responsibility o f  the State in Internal (Municipal) Law, 9 Tul. L. R e v . 1,15 
(1934).
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law.71 It was natural that Freund would be concerned with this problem since 
two focal points of his work in administrative law were the protection of pri­
vate rights and the establishment of effective administration. Both of these 
goals are impeded when interminable litigation centers around problems of 
procedure. As early as 1911,72 Freund attacked the remedies as a “needless 
legal archaism.” He observed that even where states had reduced the forms of 
action to one, the remedies refused to die. They differed in scope, being some­
times concurrent and sometimes exclusive, no one being quite sure which 
remedy fitted which fact situation. He described their boundaries as being 
wholly arbitrary and differing from state to state due to “historical accident.”
E. Separation o f Powers—Separation or Safeguards?
At a time when most writers bewailed the breakdown of the separation of 
powers caused by the growth of administrative agencies, Freund was able to 
see the complexities and inevitability in this problem. His detached and 
analytical examination of this question can not be appreciated without read­
ing the polemics of the time directed to the same issued Although Freund’s 
main concern was with efficient administrative process and the preservation of 
individual rights, he saw that the latter was not necessarily sacrificed for the 
former merely by a breakdown of strict separation:
With the growing tendency to make administrative findings of fact, based 
on notice and hearing and supported by evidence, conclusive, the objec­
tion that the proceeding involves a confusion of functions cannot be dis­
71 “No branch of administrative law is more seriously in need of reform than the common 
law of the state courts concerning methods of judicial review. . . .
“An imaginary system cunningly planned for the evil purpose of thwarting justice and 
maximizing fruitless litigation would copy the major features of the extraordinary remedies. 
For the purpose of creating treacherous procedural snares and preventing or delaying the 
decision of cases on their merits, such a scheme would insist upon a plurality of remedies.
. . D av is , A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  T e x t  443 (1959).
F r e u n d , C ases o n  A d m i n i s t r a t e  L a w  2-3 (1911).
7; In 1934 the American Bar Association committee on administrative law said: “The 
judicial branch of the Federal Government is being rapidly and seriously undermined. . . .  
The committee . . . concludes that, so far as possible, the decision of controversies be 
brought back into the judicial system.” 5'J A.B.A. R e p . 539, 549 (1934): James M. Beck, a 
former Solicitor General of the United States, published a book in 1932, declaring that all 
Federal administrative agencies were unconstitutional violations of the separation of 
powers. B e c k , O l r  W o n d e r l a n d  o f  B u r e a u c r a c y  (1932). See also note 54 supra and 
accompanying text. This antagonism, while greatlv increased by the activities of the New 
Deal, existed prior to that time. In 1927, John Dickinson proposed a total separation of 
executive and judicial functions on an agency basis: “The multiplication in recent years of 
bodies like public-service commissions and industrial-accident boards, accompanied by the 
vesting of ampler powers in health officers, building inspectors, and the like, has raised anew’ 
for our law, after three centuries, the problem of executive justice. That government offi­
cials should assume the traditional function of courts of law, and be permitted to determine 
the rights of individuals, is a development so out of line with the supposed path of our 
legal growth as to challenge renewed attention to certain underlying principles of our juris­
prudence.” D ic k in s o n , A d m in is t r a t iv e  J u s t ic e  a n d  t h e  S u p r e m a c y  o f  L a w  i n  t h e  
U n it e d  St a t e s  3 (1927).
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missed as being entirely devoid o f  merit. The same body acts as prosecutor 
and judge, and is expected to pursue and enforce policy and to make im­
partial determinations. Abstractly, this is perhaps not as it should be; but 
practically the combination of supervising and determinative functions does 
not seriously jeopardize the capacity for impartial action, as long as there is 
the possibility o f  checking abuse by judicial control; in any event, the order- 
issuing power appears to have gained a place in American government from 
which it is not likely to be . . .  dislodged.74
To Freund, the critical point was the availability of safeguards to preserve in­
dividual rights rather than strict separation of powers.
Freund observed the tendency of the courts themselves to rely on bureau­
cratic organization when called upon to exercise non-judicial powers (e.g 
naturalization, adoption, drainage districts);75 and rather than attacking the 
centralization of administrative powers, he concluded that the centralization 
better guaranteed the fair exercise of administrative power.76
F. Discretionary Powers.
To the modem reader, one strongly held belief of Freund’s seems strangely 
inconsistent with his liberal support of the administrative process77 and his 
practical realization of the inevitability78 of its growth. This was his seemingly 
rigid belief that administrative discretion is an unmitigated evil to be avoided 
and eventually replaced with more definite legislative standards. In 1923, 
speaking before the Bar Association of St. Louis, he presented a masterful 
survey of the history of American administrative law. During the course of 
the lecture he attacked the growth of administrative discretion in unqualified 
terms rarely used by this careful and precise scholar;
What we cannot say o f  administrative power in general we can say o f dis­
cretionary administrative power over individual rights, namely that it is 
undesirable p er se  and should be avoided as far as may be, for discretion 
is unstandardized power and to lodge in an official such power over person 
or property is hardly conformable to the “Rule of Law.”’®
If this were the only statement of this nature made by Freund, it might be 
explained away by reasoning that in addressing a Bar Association, he was not
74 F r e u n d , A d m in ist r a t iv e  P o w e r s  O v e r  P er so n s  a n d  P r o pe r t y  170-171 (1928).
« Id. at 33-35.
76 Id. at 40. However, Freund showed a propensity for what has turned out to be the 
losing side of the argument concerning the scope of judicial review of administrative actions. 
He granted that where Congress by statute limits judicial review to questions of law that 
review should be strictly limited. But he maintained that where the statute is silent regarding 
the scope of review, the courts should have power to review not only whether the decision 
was supported by any evidence, but whether the decision was supported by the preponderance 
of the evidence. ■
77 See p. 770 supra.
78 F r e u n d , T h e  G r o w t h  o f  A m e r ic a n  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  20 (1923).
79 Id. at 22-23.
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speaking to the most revolutionary body of men. His attack undoubtedly fell 
upon receptive ears. However, when properly circumscribed by a definition 
of what Freund meant by “individual rights,” the statement probably repre­
sents his honest belief. How, then, can it be harmonized with his general con­
fidence in the administrative process?
Perhaps, a complete reconciliation of these views cannot be achieved. 
Freund was far too complex an individual to be categorized as either a “lib­
eral” or as a “conservative.” Some of the apparent inconsistency, however, 
disappears when other factors are taken into account. He defined “adminis­
trative discretion” as follows:
When we speak of administrative discretion, we mean that a determination 
may be reached, in part at least, upon the basis of considerations not en­
tirely susceptible of proof or disproof. A statute confers discretion when 
it refers an official for the use of his power to beliefs, expectations, or 
tendencies instead of facts, or to such terms of “adequate,” “advisable,” 
“appropriate,” “beneficial,” “competent,” “convenient,” “detrimental,”
. . .  or their opposites.80 '
Had his definition of the administrative discretion to be proscribed ended at 
this point, the most that could be said for his view would be that it was very 
conservative and very dated. However, Freund made a further delimitation 
as to the type of discretion which should be limited as much as possible. This 
delimitation was not understood by his greatest critic on this issue, a fact 
which, it is submitted, substantially contributed to the inaccurate opinion 
held by many in regard to Freund’s views on administrative discretion.
Dean Wigmore, writing over a year after Freund’s speech before the St. 
Louis Bar Association, attacked his views on administrative discretion. Dean 
Wigmore contended that the “bestowal of administrative discretion, as con­
trasted with the limitation of power by a meticulous chain-work of inflexible 
detailed rules, is the best hope for governmental efficiency. What is needed 
only is not reduction, but control, of discretion.”81 As an example of this prop­
osition, he cited the “finest local government in the whole United States,” that 
of the Canal Zone under Governor Goethals, as being one of “pure discretion, 
administratively, from top to bottom.”82 The issue between Freund and Wig­
more, as Wigmore saw it, was whether reduction or control of discretion was 
the answer.
Later that year, Freund replied to Wigmore’s criticism.83 He qualified his 
indictment of administrative discretion in ways only alluded to in his St. 
Louis address. He said that discretion had many different aspects as applied
so F r e u n d , A d m in is t r a t iv e  P o w e r s  O v e r  P e r so n s  a n d  P r o p e r t y  71 (1928).
81 Wigmore (Editorial Note), 19 III. L. R e v . 440,441 (1925).
82 Ibid.
S3 Freund, Administrative Discretion: A Reply to Dean Wigmore, 19 III. L. R e v . 663 
(1925).
HeinOnline -- 29 U. Chi. L. Rev. Ill 1961-1962
778 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:755
to different activities of government. His reference to administrative discretion 
was aimed only at discretion exercised over private rights. He admitted that 
discretion in “administering governmental services presents a different prob­
lem.”84 Freund quite justifiably pointed out that Wigmore, in choosing the 
example of the Panama Canal Zone government, did not recognize this dis­
tinction. Discretionary powers over private rights, he said, should be gradually 
replaced with more concrete rules, while discretionary powers over the ad­
ministration of governmental services would always have to exist and be con­
trolled by internal procedural checks and judicial review.
By 1928 these views seemed to be both modified and clarified. Freund still 
made a basic distinction between discretionary powers over private rights and 
discretionary powers concerned with the performance of governmental serv­
ices; however, the intervening five years between his St. Louis speech and the 
writing of Administrative Powers Over Persons and P r o p e r ty had witnessed 
an injection of realism into his views on administrative discretion. During this 
time he reached several conclusions that had a direct bearing on his views on 
administrative discretion. While the following conclusion was reached by him 
many years before, it would appear that he first realized its relevance to the 
problem of administrative discretion in his later years. He had concluded that 
the era of laissez-faire governmental policy was through forever:
Most of those who are beyond middle life have been educated to regard 
neutrality with reference to business as the orthodox and desirable attitude 
of the state. The theory which this attitude reflects was probably well suited 
. to a period of profound economic transformation which could have been 
directed by law neither successfully not intelligently. Now the lines of that 
transformation have become tolerably clear, and since one of the out­
standing features of the new organization of business is the service of large 
numbers of persons by particular concerns, standardization of methods 
is almost inevitable, and it is perhaps equally inevitable that this standard­
ization should in course of time express itself in law. The tendency in other 
words seems to be toward legislative regulation of economic activity.8*
From this, with the realization that society would continue to become increas­
ingly interdependent, he concluded that two major alternatives faced the 
United States. Basic industries and utilities could be socialized, as had been 
done to a considerable degree on the continent.87 However, if this alternative 
were rejected for a system of free enterprise, he felt that a system of govern­
mental control was inevitable.88 He recognized that the United States had 
elected to follow the latter alternative and that a concomitant of this choice
» *Jbid.
F r eu n d ,  A d m in istr a tiv e  P o w ers  O v er  P ersons a n d  P r o perty  (1928).
F r e u n d , T h e  G r o w t h  o f  A m e r ic a n  A d m in is t r a t iv e  L a w  20 (1923). •
*7 Freund, op. cit. supra note 85 at 79.
88 See pp. 770-71 supra.
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was increased discretionary power. Here again his distinction between the 
uses of administrative discretion was relevant. In refuting Wigmore, he had 
distinguished the administrative discretion exercised in providing services to 
the general public from that exercised directly over private rights. To him, the 
Canal Zone government was largely of the former type, where discretionary 
powers were both necessary and desirable.8**
An examination of the situations in which he considered discretion to be 
undesirable is illuminating. He defined “unqualified discretion” as that dis­
cretion in which “private action is made dependent upon official approval or 
consent by reference to simple permissive terms without stating the grounds 
upon which the official power is to be exercised.”®0 For example, suppose a 
statute provided that a license may be granted “if in the best interest of the 
state of New York.” Freund recognized that initially such broad discretionary 
power must be granted where it appeared impossible to enumerate exactly 
under what circumstances a license should be granted or refused. However, 
after granting a number of licenses, similar fact situations would present them­
selves. What Freund emphasized was that the administrative body granting 
the licenses should not be allowed to act in opposite ways given the same fact 
situations. The “public interest” begins to take on, through the years, more 
definite meaning. Past decisions and added experience circumscribe the broad 
discretion originally held by the agency. Gradually a body of precedent would 
create what Freund called “expert discretion” replacing the “unqualified dis­
cretion” that previously existed. In some areas, Freund hoped for a further 
step: the vast experience gained by the administrators might lead to the con­
version of “expert discretion” into definite legislative standards.^1
Another limitation upon administrative discretion which he favored, and 
one that is hard to criticize, was that all statutes granting discretionary powers 
should set forth the purpose and scope of the discretion. For example, “a local 
authority having power over the construction of buildings may not refuse a 
permit on account of the supposed unsuitability of the building to the neigh­
borhood.”92 A licensing requirement ostensibly (but not so specified in the 
statute) designed to prevent the use of flammable films in movie houses should 
not be interpreted to permit denial of licenses because shareholders of a mov­
ing picture corporation were enemy aliens.93 It should be remembered that 
this gradual diminution of administrative discretion was looked for only in the 
area of discretionary powers dealing with private rights. In this area, Freund 
looked upon discretion as a temporary expedient to permit the eventual estab-
See note 83 supra.
9° Freund, op. cit. supra note 87 at 89.
91 Id. at 97-103.
92 Id. at 93.
93 Id. at 96.
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lishment of a definite rule by trial and error methods.94 However, he was not 
so unrealistic as to believe that at some later point all discretionary powers 
in this area could be eliminated. He recognized that “with new problems, new 
applications of such discretion” would be warranted.9^
In conclusion, what Freund desired to see was an expanding body of pro­
cedural and substantive law, created by the courts, the legislatures and 
the administrative agencies. He expected that as recurrent fact situations pre­
sented themselves to the regulatory agencies, a body of precedent would 
evolve, gradually circumscribing the degree of discretion exercised by the 
agencies. The desirability of this development could hardly be denied. The 
alternative would seem to be not Wigmore’s “controlled discretion,” but bald, 
arbitrary action. This growth of procedural and substantive precedent was to 
be complemented by an increasing body of legislation that included meaning­
ful standards made possible by continuing administrative experience. Con­
tinued experience was, for example, to result in a more exact knowledge of 
what constituted a rate that was “fair and reasonable.” This phrase was thus 
to be replaced by what the administrative agency had found, through, experi­
ence, to be “fair and reasonable.”
The function to discretion would then be not to displace rule but to prepare 
the way for it. On any other terms administrative discretion would be an 
anomaly. It would mean that administrative authorities are superior to 
courts in their capacity to deal with private rights, or that under modem  
conditions the public welfare demands personal government instead of gov­
ernment by law. The French say that “personal” in government is equiva­
lent to “arbitrary.” And while there is undeniably some tendency on the 
part o f administrative authorities, as an abstract proposition, to claim the 
necessity o f discretionary powers, it will probably be found, upon exami­
nation, that in practice the desire to standardize the exercise of discretionary 
power is as strong as it is in the administration of justice.96
G. Proper Subjects for Administrative Action
Freund believed that one reason for the distrust of the administrative process 
was its improper use. He felt that policy decisions involving highly controver­
sial issues should not be passed on to the administrative agencies, but should 
be made by the legislature. He maintained that the problem of improper dis­
cretion would be reduced if legislative bodies would assume responsibility 
for basic policy decisions. He further objected to the use of judicial procedure 
by administrative agencies to settle questions of fact which were essentially
94 For an interesting parallel to Freund’s idea regarding this gradual evolution of ques­
tions of law or fact from trial and error methods, see Baltimore and O. R.R. v.Goodman, 
275, U.S. 66 (1927), and its fate in Pokora v. Wabash Ry., 292 U.S. 98 (1934). " .
93 Freund, op. cit. supra note 85 at 101.
96 Id. at 102.
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legislative in nature. After observing that “the difference between law and 
fact becomes obscure” in many situations, he said: -
We should bear in mind that underlying these difficulties of administrative 
procedure is the attempt to answer perplexing questions of economic policy 
by the method of trial from case to case . . . .  It seems to be believed that 
by a combination of administrative and judicial action it will be possible 
to evolve a code of fair dealing; perhaps it can be done in part, but it is not 
likely that highly controverted issues will be ultimately settled otherwise 
than by direct legislative action.®?
V . C o n c l u s io n
Ernst Freund’s greatest contribution to administrative law was in defining 
the subject and setting its direction. Since his death in 1932, the field of ad­
ministrative law has burgeoned in size and complexity. One could not expect 
that a casebook written in 1911 would contain the same topics treated today. 
Nor could one expect the substantive views of a scholar writing before the 
New Deal to be in complete harmony with the thinking of today. But what is 
truly remarkable is that Freund was able to discern, even before this century 
began, the general direction and scope of administrative law; to see that the 
administrative process rather than constitutional issues had to be examined; 
that a choice need not be made between individual rights and administrative 
effectiveness; that administrative law was a legitimate field of the law, worthy 
and capable of being studied in the law schools. For this he well deserved the 
title—“Pioneer.”
97 Freund, Commission Powers and Public Utilities, 9 A.B.A. J. 285, 287 (1923).
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